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Recent court cases involving euthanasia appear to be sanctioning the 
so-called "right" to end one's life when certain criteria have been met. 
There appears to be a trend whereby the courts are allowing the 
medical profession to be cooperators in helping to end the lives of 
individuals. Criteria which are being used include the following: 
those people who mayor may not be suffering from a terminal illness 
who repeatedly request death; individuals who have signed a legal 
document indicating that certain treatments should either be withheld 
or withdrawn which will result in death; or a proxy whom the court 
may appoint to speak on behalf of the values of a person who is 
unable to speak for himself. Notorious cases such as Karen Quinlan 
and Nancy Cruzan who were both diagnosed with Persistent 
Vegetative State (PVS) have set certain legal precedents affecting the 
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manner in which both individuals and society view the dignity and 
life of such individuals. We present a case which bears resemblance 
to other well-known cases of individuals diagnosed with PVS which 
was brought for review before our Hospital Ethics Committee at LSU 
School of Medicine in Shreveport, Louisiana. 
"Jane Doe" is a 14-year-old female who one year ago suffered 
a severe head injury due to an automobile accident for which she was 
not responsible. She has been hospitalized in the Pediatric Intensive 
Care Unit (PICU). Due to the severe nature of this accident, Jane has 
little, if any, upper brain tissue remaining. Medical experts and 
laboratory studies confinn that she is thought to be in a pennanent 
vegetative state. She has had further complications of a central 
nervous system nature such as m.iddle cerebral artery thrombosis and 
shunt infections. Jane is not on a ventilator and she is receiving 
nutrition by a feeding tube which was surgically placed in her 
stomach. Since there is thought to be little if any upper brain tissue 
which is functioning, there is no production of Anti-Diuretic 
Honnone (AD H) from the posterior pituitary. Jane is dependent upon 
DDAVP (Desmopressin Acetate) which is an Anti-Diuretic Honnone 
that she receives twice a day by subcutaneous injection and 
withdrawal of this substance would result in rapid dehydration and 
death within hours or days. Jane's private insurance has been 
depleted; recently, she was transferred to a long-tenn care facility. 
The parents are expecting a settlement from the courts based upon 
suit filed against the person driving the vehicle which hit their 
daughter and resulted in this tragedy. Our Hospital Ethics Committee 
met to review this case and address whether or not it would be 
ethically appropriate to withdraw DDA VP which would result in 
death due to dehydration within hours or days. 
It is most relevant to review the neurological status of Jane by 
evaluating her brain stem reflexes. The following reflexes were 
examined as follows: Pupillary - absent; Corneal - absent; Grimace -
present; Jaw - present; Spontaneous Eye Motions - present; 
Oculocephalic (Doll's Head Maneuver) - absent; Oculovestibular -
absent; Acousticardiac - absent; Gag and Cough - present; 
Esophageal - absent; Ciliospinal - absent; Apnea Test - respiratory 
effort present. Brain stem reflexes evaluating a response to 
Oculoauditory, Oculocardiac, and Carotid Sinus were not examined. 
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It is thus evident that there is a brain stem function. Given that there 
is spontaneous brain stem function, we must assume the presence of a 
soul, thereby indicating that we are dealing with a living human 
being. 
The presence of a soul is known by the operations which are 
performed and are detected by effects which can be observed. The 
notion of body-soul or matter-form is one which goes back to the 
great philosopher and metaphysician, Aristotle, who held that the soul 
is the substantial form of the body - the ultimate cause of all living 
acts. Its presence is revealed through being and activity. Relying 
upon Aristotle's understanding, Christianity has recognized for almost 
2,000 years that the soul's powers can be classified into three areas: 
rational, sensitive, and vegetative. Since there is only one soul which 
is the point of origin of the three powers, any spontaneous evidence 
of any of these sets of powers performing operations clearly indicates 
that the soul is present. In the case of Jane, it is clear that there are at 
least three vegetative operations spontaneously present through the 
activity of the brain stem which is verified by the presence of the 
following reflexes: Grimace, Jaw, Spontaneous Eye Motions, Gag 
and Cough, and the Apnea Test. Because a soul is still present in 
Jane, she is a living human being and remains a human person; 
consequently, any ethical concerns of withholding or withdrawing 
any type(s) of treatment must be subjected to the same moral analysis 
which we would use in dealing with any other human life. 
Classical moral theology evaluates withholding or 
withdrawing treatments in terms of whether or not a particular 
treatment is considered to be ethically "ordinary" or "extraordinary". 
From an ethical perspective, ordinary treatments offer a reasonable 
degree of hope without imposing excessive burdens on the patient; 
extraordinary treatments offer no reasonable degree of hope and/or 
impose excessive burden on the patient. In the case of Jane, we may 
ask whether or not the DDA VP which is keeping her alive is 
considered to be ordinary or extraordinary. I believe that DDAVP is 
clearly an ethically ordinary means since it has the benefit of keeping 
her alive and its cost monthly is a bare minimum. To withdraw 
DDAVP would result in death; hence, by removing an ordinary 
means of treatment which would knowingly result in death, an act of 
passive euthanasia would occur. How many other lives with very 
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serious defects like Jane's could also be affected, in that withholding 
or withdrawing treatments which are ethically considered to be 
ordinary would result in death because either individuals or "society" 
does not see dignity or value in the life of someone who is vegetative 
or retarded or handicapped and unable to care for himself? How 
inhumane it would be to willfully cause death by dehydration in 
stopping treatment with DDA VP even if the person cannot 
consciously feel it. We must recognize that even when severe 
deformities are present in a human being, that life does not lose its 
dignity. We must support the right of these individuals to receive 
basic medical care - we must support their right to receive medical 
treatments which are ethically classified as ordinary, just as we would 
expect for ourselves. 
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